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Introduction
Despite important breakthroughs in medical science, in the nineteenth 
century infectious diseases ravaged crowded cities and towns across the 
globe with growing intensity. In the absence of reliable explanations for 
the causes of many deadly diseases, anxiety over epidemic outbreaks was 
often manifested in a powerful mixture of moral and cultural prejudice that 
saw the destitute and the impoverished designated as the likely carriers of dis-
eases due to their “uncleanly habits.”1 In colonial territories, this prejudice was 
mapped onto native populations, perceived by many Europeans to belong to 
inferior races that had yet to acquire the basic concepts of hygiene and ‘civi-
lized’ habits of living. The drawing of racial boundaries along the lines of health 
and cultural practices also allowed colonial authorities to implement racial seg-
regation and other discriminatory legislations through which different rules 
were applied.2
Recent research on colonial urbanism has shown that the regulation of 
the colonial built environment was far more contested than has been previ-
ously assumed. As a major site of ongoing resistance and control, efforts to 
improve sanitation and public health in colonial cities have attracted interest 
from a growing number of scholars.3 By examining the ways in which rules 
and regulations were resisted and appropriated in everyday practices, their 
studies have helped challenge the long-accepted dominance of the colonial 
state. Comparisons between housing and sanitary reforms in the metropole 
and the colonies, as well as indigenous responses to modernization efforts, 
have also enabled the articulation of the term “indigenous modernities,”4 
which seeks to acknowledge the multiple forms of colonial development and 
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the roles of native peoples in transforming the built environment according to 
their own motivations.
The emphasis on the opposition between ‘indigenous agency’ and the ‘colo-
nial order’ can sometimes be misleading, however. The tendency of histori-
cal accounts to focus on selected moments of conflict may leave out the more 
nuanced but arguably influential perspectives, such as those of colonial officials 
sympathetic to the natives or indigenous elites who aligned themselves with 
the colonial regimes. By slipping too easily from identifying the unequal power 
relations between the ‘colonizers’ and the ‘colonized’ to making broad asser-
tions about collective ideologies, there is risk of overlooking the more complex 
political and economic processes that shaped historical change.5
Although much has been written about the role of colonial medicine as a 
tool of imperialism, the history of public health is still largely understood as an 
uncomplicated story of scientific progress. As Christopher Hamlin contends, 
the fact that so many of the technological achievements, such as underground 
drainage and water supplies, that came to define the modern built environment 
were no longer seen as questionable only proves the extent to which they have 
been “blackboxed.”6 But although a world in which modern sanitation is rejected 
might seem inconceivable in the present, it was not so in the nineteenth century. 
The now widely praised Chadwickean public health reforms, which involved 
heavy expenditure and state intervention, were constantly challenged in respect 
to their rationality, practicality, and cultural appropriateness when they were 
first introduced. Widespread resistance against regulations to improve housing 
and sanitation can be found in cities across the British Empire, where concepts 
of health and culture and the meanings of rights and obligations were being 
debated and constructed anew by different groups. While competing theories 
of medicine coexisted in many places, they were selectively endorsed by local 
administrators who used them to legitimize policies that suited their political 
agendas.7 Meanwhile, colonial doctors, engineers, European and native land-
lords, and many others with stakes in housing and sanitary reform all sought to 
rationalize their priorities as those that served society’s best interests.
To excavate some of the ways in which ideas and knowledge of health and 
sanitation were constructed and made useful for specific purposes, this chapter 
examines a number of controversies over British efforts to eliminate nuisance 
and improve sanitary conditions in Hong Kong in the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century. In keeping with the theme of this volume, which explores the 
complex entanglement between medicine, public health, and colonial plan-
ning in Asia, this chapter demonstrates the extent to which colonial sanitary 
measures were contested and appropriated by the local Chinese population. 
The first of these controversies involves a challenge launched by Chinese 
property owners against a set of building regulations that aimed to make the 
Chinese tenements more ‘healthy.’ The second concerns the provision of a 
universal water supply for the native population—an initiative that colonial 
sanitary engineers argued was essential for inducing personal cleanliness and 
preventing epidemic outbreaks. Finally, the chapter considers the debate over 
the demolition of a large number of ‘unsanitary’ Chinese houses after the 1894 
bubonic plague outbreak, which incited a flurry of debate over the colonial 
state’s simultaneous obligation to protect private property rights and the health 
and wellbeing of its subjects.
While all the cases concern specific issues and policy actions (and inaction), 
taken together they indicate how certain rationalities about development, 
public health, property rights, and Hong Kong as a colonial ‘laissez-faire’ polity 
itself came to be accepted and consolidated over time despite the apparent dis-
putes over many initiatives when they were first introduced. It is argued that 
what needs to be examined is not so much the extent to which native popula-
tions were being discriminated against in specific policies or projects, but the 
emergence of new modes of governance wherein the ‘colonizers’ and the ‘colo-
nized’ both adapted themselves to a changing political and economic order.8 
This is certainly not to downplay the inequalities and coercion existing in a 
colonial situation. But more attention to co-options and dialogues—not just 
outright contestation and conflicts—is needed because all are essential ele-
ments in the construction of discourse. As Robert Peckham and David Pomfret 
point out in the introduction to this volume, the discourses and technologies 
of health used to construct subject peoples’ identities formed an essential part 
of indigenous agents’ interactions with such framings. Attending to the shifting 
allegiances between Chinese property owners and the colonial state in three 
cases, this chapter seeks to bring to light the contradictions within the colonial 
planning culture of Hong Kong and the market system which underpinned it. 
A further aim, is to explore the formation of “epistemic communities,” inves-
tigating the ways in which these communities both challenged and helped to 
shape Hong Kong’s colonial culture.9
Speculation, Regulation, and the Colonial Conundrum
The urban condition of early Hong Kong exemplifies the laissez-faire devel-
opment characteristic of so many of the colonial entrepôts that emerged in 
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the nineteenth century. Constrained by an imperial fiscal policy that required 
it to pay for its own public works and administrative expenses, the colonial 
administration had been reluctant to commit to long-term planning and urban 
investment.10 Because Hong Kong was designated as a free port and thus could 
not impose taxes on imported goods, its options for raising public funds were 
limited mainly to the collection of land rent, property rate, and licensing fees 
for local trades and services. To maximize revenue, the government adopted a 
‘high land price policy’ within a leasehold system. By keeping a strict limit on 
land supply while not imposing too many regulations on development, it was 
able to ensure a good return from land auctions and property taxes.11 While 
this system was lauded for its success in boosting fiscal revenue and creat-
ing a competitive ‘free’ land market, it also led to a chronic housing shortage 
and rampant property speculation that drove up rental costs to an exorbitant 
level. The problem was worst in the Chinese districts, where many low-income 
laborers had little choice but to share bed spaces in crowded and often poorly 
constructed tenements.12 Ironically, the high rental return offered by these 
tenements through subdivision also made them an extremely profitable prop-
erty holding. Moreover, many European and Chinese landowners preferred 
to invest in this type of building rather than the better-built European houses 
designed for single families.
From the very beginning of colonial rule, the government was keen to 
encourage Chinese property ownership (even though the most valuable prop-
erties were always reserved for lease to Europeans).13 This was because the 
British understood that, as a non-settler colony with a small European popula-
tion, Hong Kong’s economic viability would depend on attracting native capital 
to help foster development and trade. By allowing the Chinese to buy and sell 
properties, the government also hoped to create new legal obligations between 
the colonial state and its subjects, thus achieving lasting stability through the 
rule of law. From early on, the highly lucrative housing market attracted many 
Chinese to invest in the colony. Like their European counterparts, many were 
able to amass substantial fortunes from their investments and came to assume 
control over a large number of property holdings. By the 1870s, the Chinese 
outnumbered Europeans as the largest taxpayers, with their assets concen-
trated in rental properties in Taipingshan and Kennedy Town—the two largest 
Chinese settlements in Hong Kong.
The shortage of housing was exacerbated after the mid-1850s, when con-
tinual political unrest in China drove multiple waves of refugees to the colony, 
seeking shelter and jobs.14 Although the number of houses had increased more 
than threefold by the 1870s, the housing crisis continued unabated, fueling 
even more speculation that further pushed up property prices. The situa-
tion made some European property owners grow uneasy, as they feared the 
rapid growth and rising prices of the tenements would depreciate the value 
of European buildings. Meanwhile, articles in the local English press began to 
warn of the danger of potential epidemic outbreaks in the Chinese districts, 
where overcrowding and the unsanitary conditions of tenement houses made 
perfect breeding grounds for diseases. These concerns were further intensi-
fied during the property boom in the late 1870s, when a number of European 
buildings in the central business district were torn down to make way for the 
construction of Chinese tenements.15 These incidents raised widespread criti-
cism in the press against the property speculators’ greed and the government’s 
failure to protect the security and wellbeing of the (European) community.
The colonial administration was certainly not unaware of the poor state 
of the tenements. Successive colonial surgeons and surveyors general, for 
example, had for years been calling for more stringent construction stand-
ards for Chinese houses and better provision of infrastructure services. These 
recommendations were repeatedly made in the annual medical and sanitary 
reports, which also provided detailed documentation of the existing housing 
conditions and ‘habits’ of the native inhabitants. Written in a language that 
reflects the emerging discourse of public health, these reports were vehement 
in their criticism of the Chinese tenements, which were deemed to be “against 
every rule of sanitation in regards to drainage, ventilation, and cleanliness.”16 
While the Chinese were condemned for their “dirty habits,” which were said to 
further worsen the conditions of their dwellings, it was the property specula-
tors and the colonial administration who were blamed for creating the high-
rent situation that was the root of the problem.
Despite their vivid depictions of squalor and grave warnings of disease 
outbreaks in these spaces, the reports failed to usher in any significant policy 
changes (at least not until the outbreak of the bubonic plague in 1894). 
Although government officials frequently denigrated the Chinese houses as 
slum dwellings, the worry that excessive building regulations would drive 
away property investment and lower tax revenue had created a long-standing 
impediment to sanitary reform. Within the colonial administration, opinions 
were divided between those who believed that some control was needed to cool 
down speculation, and others who adhered to the laissez-faire principle that 
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opposed any intervention in the market or tightening of building regulations. 
A salient representative of the latter was Governor John Pope-Hennessy, whose 
tenure coincided with the colony’s economic boom at the end of the 1870s. 
In his attempt to convince other officials that sanitary reform was unneces-
sary, the governor argued that the ‘Western’ concept of public health was not 
appropriate to apply to the native Chinese, who, he claimed, possessed different 
customs and health practices from those of the Europeans.17 Referring to the 
overall decline in death rates in the population, Hennessy insisted that Hong 
Kong was in fact becoming a more ‘healthy’ city—a development that paral-
leled the colony’s unprecedented economic growth that was primarily due to 
increased investment by the Chinese.
Although Hennessy’s ‘pro-Chinese’ position proved controversial among 
his contemporaries,18 the support that he won from the Chinese suggests 
that this strategy was successful. Hennessy’s invocation of ‘cultural difference’ 
between the natives and Europeans illustrates how the discourse of culture 
was used to legitimize particular political priorities, and in the process opened 
up new channels for the application of colonial power. Contrary to the 
opinions of the colonial doctors and sanitary engineers who believed that 
the natives could become more hygienic and ‘civilized’ like the Europeans 
through positive environments and proper education, the notion of ‘differ-
ence’ was presented by Hennessy as a reason for maintaining the status quo. 
At the same time, by asserting that the uniqueness of Chinese customs should 
be respected, Hennessy also set his claim against that of many Europeans 
who saw the difference between China and the ‘West’ to be about different 
stages of human development. As will be discussed in the following section, 
this rationality of cultural distinctions was also deployed by the Chinese in a 
different way in their attempt to contest legislation that would impinge upon 
their economic interests.
Re-appropriating Chineseness: The Petition against the 
Improved Tenements
In short, the 1860s and 1870s were boom decades marked by a rapid rise of 
property ownership by the Chinese, who continued to buy up existing proper-
ties from the Europeans while acquiring new land for development. Although 
these native landlords were subjected to colonial overlordship, they were highly 
aware of the political bargaining power enabled by their growing capital. One of 
the ways in which the Chinese property owners tried to use their leverage was 
through petitioning the governor and the Colonial Office on matters affecting 
their interests, particularly on taxation, land rent, and the regulation of housing 
properties. Depending on the issues, these petitions sometimes drew upon the 
support of other European landholders, and at other times claimed to speak on 
behalf of the ‘Chinese community.’
One telling example that illustrates the contest against sanitary reform is a 
development proposal initiated by one Chinese landholder, Li Tak-cheong. In 
1879, Li sent an application to Surveyor General J. M. Price for the construc-
tion of a total of 79 houses at the new Praya recently reclaimed by the govern-
ment.19 Upon seeing these plans, which showed that most of the houses would 
be constructed back-to-back, Price decided not to grant his approval unless 
the design was significantly modified to take on board his sanitary concerns. 
Specifically, Price requested that additional alleyways, windows, and backyards 
be included to allow more light and ventilation. He also remarked that the 
plans did not show any privy or sinks, which were deemed necessary according 
to the “European point of view.” Calling the proposed houses “the most aggra-
vated type of fever-den,” Price lamented that part of the problem lay with the 
Chinese tenants’ ignorance about sanitation, which allowed speculative land-
lords such as Li to extract high rent for such poorly designed dwellings.20
The proposed houses were in fact not very different from the colony’s exist-
ing Chinese tenements, which were typically built to accommodate a large 
number of laborers by subdividing the upper floors into cubicles—conditions 
that had long been condemned by successive colonial surgeons and surveyors 
general. What made this case particularly alarming to Price was the develop-
ment’s unprecedented scale, which involved not only house-building but also 
the creation of many privately constructed streets and alleyways on newly 
reclaimed land. In his letter to the colonial secretary, Price pointed out that 
Li had become by far the largest builder in the colony and had been carrying 
out his operations on a large scale.21 As Li’s only concern was to maximize his 
rental income with no regard whatsoever for sanitation and the wellbeing of 
his tenants, Price urged the government to impose a more comprehensive set 
of controls over building and planning to safeguard the health and the future 
growth of Victoria. To this end, Price issued further detailed instructions to Li 
and his architect on ways to improve the tenements and indicated that these 
recommendations should be adopted for all new buildings.
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After seeing Price’s recommended changes to the proposal, Li was alarmed. 
He immediately met with other Chinese landlords and together they sent a 
petition to the governor.22 This petition subsequently found its way to the 
Colonial Office in London as the battle over the building plans continued, with 
Governor Hennessy lending his support to the Chinese landlords and Price 
and other officials pressing for stronger imposition of sanitary regulations. In 
the petition, the property owners argued that Price’s proposed “improved tene-
ments,” which could accommodate far fewer inhabitants than the existing ones 
due to the inclusion of additional alleyways, backyards, and windows, were 
not suited for the Chinese at all. Chinese people, they claimed, were essentially 
different from Westerners in their living standards and health practices, and 
thus would not appreciate the new sanitary provisions that were designed for a 
“very superior class of residence.” Furthermore, they claimed that
Chinese habits were the outcome of a lengthened experience among  
the Chinese living in large and crowded cities, and are as deep rooted as 
most of their social customs, so that it is quite certain that the tenants for 
whom these houses are intended as they would not understand the reason, 
would in no way avail themselves of the facilities for the free access of light 
and air which the Surveyor General’s proposed alterations would provide 
for them.
The windows looking out into the proposed alleys would be kept 
closed and the alleys themselves not being intended for use as thorough-
fares, would be made receptacles for the deposit of refuse and filth which 
would beyond question be suffered to accumulate to an extent in itself 
dangerous to health.23
The petitioners also claimed that back-to-back housing, which was from the 
point of view of Western sanitarians unhealthy due to the lack of light and 
ventilation, had been a legitimate form of housing throughout Chinese history. 
Citing as examples areas from mainland China that were free from epidemic 
diseases, they argued that “it has been the practice from time immemorial to 
build houses back-to-back.” The petition then went on to state that the new 
proposal would lead to a waste of land resources, and that since land had 
become extremely valuable in Hong Kong, it was necessary to make the best 
use of space in order to make their investment profitable. Meanwhile, since 
Chinese tenants were “as a rule unwilling to pay high rents, it was only by 
dividing the houses into cubicles that many families and individuals could find 
suitable shelters.”24
Although the petition was obviously aimed at preserving the interests of 
property owners, its main argument was structured around a generalized claim 
about racial difference. Building on the existing discourse of the cultural divide 
between Chinese and Europeans, it sought to discredit the sanitary regula-
tions—now cast as a quintessential product of ‘Western science’—by affirming 
that it was wrong to apply these standards to the Chinese race, which possessed 
a different, but no less sophisticated system for managing health and environ-
ment. The assertion that the Chinese were fully capable of taking care of them-
selves also had the effect of arousing a sense of collective pride and nationalistic 
sentiment, even though the ultimate goal was, ironically, to reinforce the status 
quo of colonial laissez-faire practices. By framing the sanitary debate around 
notions of race and culture, the petition also sought to evade the simmering 
discontent about speculation and the housing problem, as well as the inequal-
ity between the propertied class and the property-less, in a fast-expanding 
colonial capitalist city.
Towards Universalism? The Controversy over Water Supplies
In addition to the provision of light and ventilation, another issue that occu-
pied the sanitary debate was the supply and distribution of water. Although 
the introduction of running water and an underground drainage system was 
hailed as representing a new phase of modernization in the nineteenth century, 
the actual functioning of these services was for many years fraught with prob-
lems due to inadequate supply and difficulty in maintenance. Instead of fulfill-
ing their promise to make cities more healthy, these infrastructures were soon 
criticized for doing exactly the opposite: the prevalence of leaky pipes, choked 
drains, and dysfunctional water closets was blamed for breeding diseases and 
endangering public health.25 These conditions also became the perfect excuse 
for those who opposed large-scale sanitary reforms, as it had been argued that 
the more elaborate these systems became, the more vulnerable they were to 
collapse and disaster.
The situation in Hong Kong was an extreme example of this paradox. 
Because of the constraints of its island geography, water shortage had been a 
constant threat as the colony depended entirely on rainfall for its water supply. 
This was partially mitigated by the construction of hillside reservoirs and gath-
ering grounds for holding water reserves. However, the supply was never able 
to meet the demand of a rapidly expanding population.26 Compounding the 
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problem was Hong Kong’s hilly topography, which made it difficult and expen-
sive to channel water to different parts of the city.27 Although hydraulic tech-
nology at the time was able to make the distribution system more efficient, the 
government was unwilling to invest money in the required infrastructure. So 
while engineers had repeatedly drawn up detailed proposals for improving the 
water supply, many components in their plans remained unrealized.
To economize on the use of water, the Water Authority (a branch of the 
Public Works Department) operated an intermittent system that restricted 
supply to certain hours of the day during the dry season. But this operation had 
been criticized by the sanitary engineers, who pointed out that, once emptied, 
the water pipes were prone to the entry of foul air and disease-causing germs.28 
From this perspective, informed by the miasmatic theory of disease, the inter-
mittent system appeared to be injurious to health and had to be replaced by a 
constant system. However, the latter could only be made possible by increasing 
funding to expand the distribution of water.
Besides arguing from the standpoint of sanitary science, the engineers also 
provided an economic justification for the provision of a constant supply of 
water. Contrary to the prevalent logic of conserving water by limiting supply, 
they argued that a constant system could prevent waste if each house was 
installed with a meter that monitored water consumption. Once the usage 
exceeded a certain volume, charges would be applied to households on a pro-
gressive scale, thus encouraging people not to use more than they needed. But 
this initiative, which followed the operation in place in England at the time 
(and which eventually became the model for the present-day system), was 
not well received when first introduced. Not unlike the controversy over the 
improvement of the tenement houses, competing justifications for the demand 
for water were put forward by various stakeholders. And not surprisingly, race 
and culture came to the fore once again.
Before discussing the debate over the proposal for a universal water supply, 
it would be useful to provide an overview of the water consumption pattern 
in Hong Kong. By 1882, close to 2,000 European houses were provided with 
running water services connected to the public mains.29 Many of these houses 
also had water closets installed (even though most were not fully functional). 
In contrast, very few Chinese houses were connected to services, and water 
closets were typically non-existent. Despite this vast discrepancy, water was 
charged at a uniform rate to all of the buildings.30 Those living up in the hills 
often had trouble getting a stable supply due to imperfect channeling. But many 
Europeans believed that this was due to water being used up by the Chinese 
living in the lower part of the city, and they therefore opposed the latter apply-
ing for new services.
Those without services (including most people living in the tenements) 
had to fetch water from the public standpipes that operated only in the early 
morning. This inconvenient arrangement created job opportunities for several 
hundred ‘water coolies,’ who made money by collecting water from the public 
standpipes and delivering it to individual households. Many people also 
obtained water from shallow wells and even rainwater drains. Although the 
water from these sources was unsuitable for drinking and cooking purposes, 
it was regularly sold, disguised as fresh water, to households. As the newspa-
pers from this period indicate, scams involving the sale of contaminated water 
were common, and quarrels over such matters were a daily occurrence on the 
streets. These scenarios were regularly condemned in the local English press 
as a nuisance. But owing to the inadequacy of water supply, the government 
nevertheless continued to tolerate these practices.
To justify the unequal distribution of water between the European and 
Chinese districts, the government maintained that it was inappropriate to 
provide services to the tenements due to the lack of control over usage by mul-
tiple households. But a more significant reason was an underlying prejudice 
that held that the Chinese, especially the many ‘lower-class coolies,’ tended to 
waste more water than average Europeans. This ascription of ‘native ignorance’ 
about modern technologies was frequently invoked in legislative council meet-
ings. As one government official once caricatured them, “Chinese coolies were 
always ready to turn on a tap but had a horrible horror of turning it off.”31 For 
this reason, it was argued that the best way to prevent waste was to make the 
Chinese get their water from the public standpipes, because they could not 
carry away more than they needed.
The idea of using meters to monitor water consumption and reduce waste 
can be seen as a major attempt by public health advocates to transform regula-
tory practice. Following the operation in Britain, it is believed that by assigning 
a value to water and turning it into a payable commodity, individuals—both 
Europeans and Chinese—would be willingly inclined to use less of it. Another 
major advantage of a universal supply was that it would eliminate the use of 
contaminated wells and the illegal sale of water. In this way, bringing the ‘free’ 
circulation of fresh water to every house would not only help prevent diseases 
and improve the health of the population, but would also foster a new set of 
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social and economic relationships that would in turn redefine the boundaries 
between the private and public spheres. Like the regulation of the tenements, 
the initiative was grounded in an emerging liberal universalism that suggested 
lives could be bettered by the provision of the right material conditions. In 
this view, the expansion of urban services could mediate individual conduct 
and transform social norms. However, the creation of such “liberal infrastruc-
tures”32 in a colonial society was stymied by the government’s long-standing 
reluctance to spend money on public goods, on the one hand, and Europeans’ 
demands that their privilege be protected, on the other.
The debate over Hong Kong’s water supply intensified in the early 1880s 
amid growing concerns over epidemic outbreaks. Internal tensions within the 
colonial administration reached their peak in 1881, when a dispute between the 
‘pro-Chinese’ Governor Hennessy and the colonial surgeon over the improve-
ment of drainage turned into an impasse, eventually prompting the secretary 
of state to send Osbert Chadwick, a consultant engineer of the Colonial Office, 
to Hong Kong to investigate the situation. Chadwick’s visit resulted in the pro-
duction of a landmark report that mapped out a series of drastic measures to 
improve the colony’s sanitary conditions.33 Among the major recommenda-
tions was the provision of a universal water supply that included all the tene-
ments. To ensure equity of water distribution, the city would be divided into 
districts based upon altitude to allow the water supply to be turned on in suc-
cession. Meters would be provided by the government and rented to property 
owners. To prevent waste, Chadwick urged that stricter regulations be set up 
to ensure the proper use of pipes and fittings. The “evil” intermittent system 
would be replaced by a constant system after the completion of a new reservoir 
that was expected to vastly increase the water supply.34
Under pressure from the Colonial Office, the Hong Kong government pro-
ceeded to carry out Chadwick’s plans. In the 1880s and 1890s, hundreds of 
tenement houses were connected to the water supply. But the installation of 
meters lagged behind due to the heavy expense involved. The problem of water 
shortages came to a head again in the late 1890s when the colony experienced 
a prolonged drought. A report released in 1902 showed that the waste of water 
had not been reduced.35 The capacity of the new reservoir at Tai Tam proved 
insufficient to alleviate the water shortage and, despite the potential danger it 
posed of contaminating the public mains, the intermittent system continued 
to be in use by the Water Authority. Meanwhile, European residents protested 
fiercely against providing water to the tenements, as the number of applications 
for the service continued to soar.
In the face of these problems, the government drafted a new Water 
Consolidation Bill in 1902, aiming to disconnect all services to the tenements.36 
In his letter to the secretary of state, Acting Governor Gascoigne reiterated the 
claim that it was inappropriate to provide running water to the “lower-class” 
Chinese, who were inclined to abuse such services for their own gains. In addi-
tion, he further alleged that, once provided with the service, the Chinese land-
lords would raise the rent to cover the water charges, thus further increasing 
the hardship of poorer tenants. Speaking in a familiarly paternalistic and self-
righteous tone, Gascoigne argued that, because the priority of the government 
was to ensure the smooth functioning of Hong Kong’s entrepôt economy, it 
had a duty to “protect” its “lower-class” laborers from being exploited by their 
landlords, whose only concern was to secure their rental profits.
After the bill was publicized, the Chinese property owners sent a lengthy 
petition to the secretary of state, Joseph Chamberlain.37 Referring to Chadwick 
on the imperative of health, they warned that the new bill would defeat the 
government’s ultimate goal of improving sanitation, because the cutting of sup-
plies to the tenements would “induce the Chinese not to cleanse their dwell-
ings.” The property owners further underscored the necessity of water supply 
by citing clauses from the English Public Health Act, asking,
If an adequate supply of water is considered a vital necessity for sanita-
tion in a temperate climate like England, how much more should not a 
constant supply of water be considered an absolute necessity to every tene-
ment house in a tropical climate like Hong Kong?38
To solve the problem of water shortage, the petitioners suggested the govern-
ment provide a subsidiary “rider main” system to be connected to the tene-
ments. This operation was originally conceived by Chadwick as a temporary 
measure to allow the Water Authority to provide an intermittent service 
without the risk of contaminating the public main. If the government could 
agree with this initiative and suspend the new water bill, the petitioners prom-
ised that they would share the expenses incurred in the construction.39
In his response, Chamberlain expressed his support for the Chinese prop-
erty owners, contending that he was inclined to reject the new water bill 
because “when the great majority of the resident taxpayers of a colony protest 
in this manner against a measure, normally considered of a very reaction-
ary nature, and given willingness to bear the expense necessary to meet their 
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views, they should if possible be met halfway and must certainly be treated 
with great consideration.”40
Unlike the earlier petition in which ‘cultural difference’ between the Chinese 
and Europeans was emphasized, this time the Chinese property owners were 
fighting for their right to water access by appealing to the “universal need” for 
sanitation and public health. Conversely, the colonial administration, in strug-
gling to deal with the multiple challenges involved in supplying water to the 
population, resorted to a racial argument that blamed the “lower-class” natives 
for misusing urban services. But despite the contrasting perspectives in these 
narratives, all were nevertheless claiming that their initiatives would preserve 
the best interests of Hong Kong. The oscillating positions of the property 
owners and the colonial government in these cases also illustrate the ambigu-
ous relationship between health, culture, and the built environment, and the 
fact that economic considerations always played a central role in reshaping 
these discourses. These contestations were played out in an even bigger con-
troversy over sanitary reform: the resumption of a large number of tenements 
after the bubonic plague outbreak.41
The Taipingshan Resumption and the Discourse of Property 
Rights
The bubonic plague outbreak in Hong Kong, referred to elsewhere in this 
volume by Peckham, Pomfret, Richard Harris, and Robert Lewis, was a dis-
astrous episode that killed over 2,500 people in the summer of 1894. As in 
other cities that experienced epidemics in the nineteenth century, the event 
led to wild speculation over the causes of disease and much finger-pointing 
at those held responsible for the catastrophe.42 The fact that a majority of the 
victims were Chinese sparked intense fear among Europeans of contracting 
diseases from the “dirty natives.” Meanwhile, the militant measures imposed 
by the Sanitary Board to combat the plague, including forced removal of 
patients from their homes, compulsory closure of many “unsanitary houses” 
for disinfection, and the eviction of thousands of tenants, led to widespread 
anger among the Chinese community. The resulting mass exodus of laborers 
to China and the drastic decline of trade brought the colonial economy to a 
standstill. As Governor William Robinson contended, “as far as trade and com-
merce was concerned, the plague had assumed the importance of an unexam-
pled calamity.”43
As the plague began to subside, the government appointed a Housing 
Committee to investigate ways to prevent any future recurrence of the catas-
trophe. From the outset, the focus of the committee was Taipingshan—the 
Chinese district where most of the plague cases were located. By this time, 
medical experts had already identified the plague bacillus. But despite the 
general acceptance of germ theory, colonial doctors and engineers contin-
ued to explain disease transmission by referring to the principles of miasma, 
asserting that the plague was spread through air emanating from the ground 
where the bacillus flourished.44 This belief fit well with the observation that 
the soil of Taipingshan was typically soaked with sewage discharged from dys-
functional drains and through the broken floors of the buildings above. After 
examining the situation, the committee concluded that the best solution was 
to demolish all the buildings by fire, cast away the contaminated topsoil, and 
redevelop the area with better built houses, ample open space, and a more effi-
cient drainage system.45 To this end, the committee recommended that the 
government enact a new ordinance to resume 10 acres of land for redevelop-
ment. Compensation would be paid to the property owners via a government-
appointed Arbitration Board.
This, then, was the background for the first major land resumption in Hong 
Kong—an episode hailed in colonial records as an historic turning point, as 
the government took a decisive step towards long-term planning to protect the 
wellbeing of the population. But this was far from being a straightforward, tri-
umphal story of benevolence. The legitimacy of the resumption was challenged 
on every front throughout the process. When the proposal was announced, it 
immediately caused a stir in the press, fueling debates over the infringement 
of property rights and the spending of large sums of taxpayers’ money on the 
destruction of private properties. While some praised the government for 
finally waking up to the call for sanitary reform, others argued that the initia-
tive would be futile, because it was, after all, the “dirty habits” of the Chinese, 
not the buildings, that were responsible for spreading diseases.46
A prominent opponent of resumption was one Granville Sharp—a British 
builder and well-known philanthropist who owned a large number of rental 
properties in Hong Kong. In a series of articles titled “Plague and Prevention,” 
published in the Hongkong Daily Press,47 Sharp wrote that, although the condi-
tions of some tenements in Taipingshan were so bad that they had to be rebuilt, 
many others could be made “sanitary” by disinfection and minor alterations, 
such as adding windows to bring in light and ventilation. He also challenged 
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the committee’s suggestion that the houses be burnt and the polluted soil 
removed, warning that such actions could reactivate the plague bacillus and 
thus invite unimaginable disasters. But above all else, Sharp argued that the 
wholesale demolition of Taipingshan should be avoided because of its negative 
impact on housing and public health. The tearing down of so many tenements, 
he asserted, would further limit accommodation for the poor and exacerbate 
the overcrowding that was the ultimate enemy of sanitation. Speaking in the 
voice of a philanthropist, Sharp urged that more attention be paid to the needs 
of the native laborers:
Our dependence upon Chinese cheap labor is becoming everyday more 
manifest. The interests of the poorer classes of Chinese are now assuming 
an importance unknown before, and their necessities must be most care-
fully considered . . .
Instead of [demolishing those houses], every square yard of existing 
roof in the Island needs to be preserved, for the protection of the people 
who resort here, who are essential to us, and who advance our welfare. 
We want much more accommodation instead of less. This is the only way 
to combat overcrowding. The destruction of Taipingshan will throw great 
difficulties in the way of carrying out the beneficent intentions of the 
Government and the real wishes of the Sanitary Board.48
Finally, Sharp pointed out that plague prevention could not be achieved by 
fixing one area alone. Instead of using considerable public funds to destroy all 
the properties, he suggested that the government provide incentives such as 
rent relief for property owners and tenants to carry out sanitary improvements 
themselves, because the best result could only be accomplished by “mutual 
help between landlords, tenants and the authorities.”49
In hindsight, one could argue that these statements were somewhat self-
serving, as it was clear that Sharp was trying to prevent the demolition of his 
own properties. But these comments also illustrate the uncertainties encoun-
tered in the struggle to combat a deadly disease whose cause and means of 
prevention remained unknown. Despite the racist overtones of some of his 
writings, Sharp’s warnings against the destructive consequences of the resump-
tion resonated with many Chinese landlords, merchants and shopkeepers, who 
became increasingly concerned not only with their properties’ loss of value, 
but also with the negative impact that the exodus of Chinese laborers from 
the colony would have on economic conditions. This anxiety was also shared 
by some administrative officials, who were wary of public discontent over the 
government’s handling of the crisis.
It is not clear to what extent Sharp was able to influence public opinion, but 
growing resistance against the resumption was apparent in the months follow-
ing the publication of his articles—a time when the plague had already sub-
sided. Editorials in major newspapers such as the Hongkong Daily Press and 
Hongkong Telegraph began to renege on their earlier support for the demo-
lition and turned their attention to issues of property rights protection and 
compensation for the owners. Although the Chinese laborers were continually 
caricatured as villains for spreading diseases, Chinese and European landlords 
were united in their fight against the resumption and for compensation for the 
rental income lost during the plague (when their houses were shut down by 
the Sanitary Board for disinfection). Their view was shared by a majority of the 
unofficial legislative council members, who had attempted to organize a com-
mittee to inquire about alternative ways to improve Taipingshan.50 Although 
their initiative ultimately failed and the resumption ordinance was pushed 
through by the official majority (who outnumbered the unofficial members by 
proportion), the government was subjected to heavy criticism by the press and 
was eventually forced to reconstitute the legislative council by increasing the 
number of its unofficial members.
The opposition to the resumption by the unofficial legislators was not sur-
prising; after all, most of them were directly connected to the largest prop-
erty firms in Hong Kong.51 The highly mixed pattern of property ownership 
in Taipingshan arguably defied the long-standing stereotype of the area as a 
purely ‘Chinese district’ disconnected from the ‘European town.’52 Somewhat 
ironically, the only unofficial legislator who supported the ordinance was the 
Chinese barrister and physician, Kai Ho Kai (knighted in 1912), who was also 
a longtime member of the Sanitary Board. Trained in England as a physician 
and later as a lawyer, Ho had long sought to educate the native Chinese about 
Western knowledge of medicine and public health.53 Although he had previ-
ously opposed some of the building regulations on the tenements, on the basis 
that these would exacerbate the housing crisis, he was adamant about the com-
plete reconstruction of Taipingshan for plague prevention.54 To this end, unlike 
his European counterparts in the legislative council, Ho stood firmly with the 
colonial doctors and engineers who believed that nothing less than razing all 
the houses would allow the government to carry out a proper planning agenda, 




After months of negotiation, the property owners of Taipingshan finally 
accepted the compensation offered by the Arbitration Board. All of the 384 
houses in the plague-ridden district were razed the following year.55 However, 
the contestation over property rights was far from over. In January 1895, a peti-
tion jointly signed by a large number of European and Chinese landlords who 
owned tenement houses outside the Taipingshan district was sent to Secretary 
of State Chamberlain.56 The petitioners demanded compensation for rental 
income lost during the plague on the grounds that this amount was included 
in the payment to the Taipingshan landlords. They also petitioned to suspend 
a regulation that required them to maintain their buildings in accordance with 
several new standards introduced by the Sanitary Board, which would take 
possession of their properties if these rules were not observed.57 The petitioners 
protested that such a regulation constituted a fundamental violation of their 
property rights, and that it was not the landlords’ duty to supervise the condi-
tions of the tenements:
A landlord having once let his house has no right to be visiting and 
inspecting it at all hours of the day and night, and the only possible way 
of preventing the erection and maintenance of illegal floors and partitions 
is by appointing proper sanitary inspectors with statutory power to visit 
and inspect the various buildings from time to time, and the same remarks 
apply to the number of persons inhabiting a building.58
The petition ended with a somewhat threatening statement, that if the new 
regulation was put in practice it would devastate the colonial economy:
[I]t will necessarily deter capitalists from investing either as owners or 
mortgagees of leaseholds in Hongkong, and will cause those who have 
already invested to withdraw their money at the earliest possible moment. 
The shock to confidence and good faith which the confiscation clause of 
this ordinance must cause will inevitably tend to drive the investing public 
away and thus cause most serious detriment to the Colony.59
The war of words between the administration and the property owners over 
the sanitary regulations was to continue for many more years (a new Public 
Health Ordinance was not enacted until 1903), all along fueling more ques-
tions not only about the protection of property rights, but also the legitimacy 
of a non-representative government that had long been accustomed to pushing 
through its policies without regard for public opinion. Meanwhile, the razing 
of Taipingshan had not prevented the return of the plague (which became an 
annual affair well into the early 1920s), and the problems of high rent, housing 
shortage, and the lack of urban services would continue to haunt Hong Kong 
for another three-quarters of a century.
Conclusion
The three controversies examined in this chapter have shown how discourses 
of health and sanitation, which had provoked intense public debate amidst 
the growing fear of epidemic outbreaks in Hong Kong in the late nineteenth 
century, had been re-appropriated and constructed anew by different social 
actors for specific purposes. By tracing the debates over public health, prop-
erty rights, and the obligations of colonial authorities in the preceding cases, I 
have illustrated some of the underlying tensions in colonial capitalist develop-
ment, in which the entanglement of public and private interests in property 
repeatedly thwarted attempts to implement building regulations and sanitary 
reform. These conflicts point to the unstable frameworks of colonial segrega-
tion and the multiple forces that shaped colonial space, which, as identified 
by Peckham and Pomfret, was inherently “fraught with tensions and contra-
dictions between ideology and practical exigencies, between local and central 
government, indigenous resistance and colonial indigenization.”
Notwithstanding prevalent European prejudice against the Chinese for 
their incivility and “dirty habits,” the highly mixed ownership of the tenements 
had helped unite Chinese and European property owners in their resistance 
to policies that affected their interests as rentiers. As their economic power 
grew, Chinese landlords became increasingly assertive in exercising their rights 
under the colonial rule of law. Although their actions can be seen as evidence 
of ‘native agency,’ so to speak, they also indicate a process through which the 
Chinese propertied class was being incorporated more tightly into the colo-
nial governing regime. Meanwhile, the advent of the public health movement, 
predicated on the provision of universal urban services and betterment of the 
lives of laborers, exerted further pressure on the colonial authority, which 
had been struggling with its simultaneous obligations to ensure the smooth 
functioning of a laissez-faire economy and to protect European privilege in an 
exclusionary colonial society.
The examination of the convergence of interests between the Chinese and 
European property owners and their shifting allegiance to the colonial state 
also reveals the complex power relations between these agencies, thereby 
unsettling the long-assumed divide between ‘colonizers’ and the ‘colonized.’ 
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The comparison of the different ways in which ‘race’ and ‘culture’ were invoked 
in the sanitary debate further illustrates the malleability of these categories, 
which were continuously re-articulated to support very different agendas. 
At the same time, the constant appeal to preserve the ‘collective interests’ of 
Hong Kong—most notably property rights, the rule of law, and the laissez-
faire economy—suggests that, behind all the contestation and conflict, there 
was nevertheless a growing consensus in support of a particular rationality of 
development that was believed to have enabled Hong Kong’s economic success 
under colonial rule.
Although questions about vested interests in property were not lost in public 
debates during the period investigated in this chapter, these issues have been 
largely absent from the mainstream historiographies of Hong Kong. Narratives 
of urban development have often focused on the antagonism between the 
Chinese and Europeans, whereas accounts of the history of public health and 
urban services have tended to highlight technological advances by medical 
experts and engineers. By looking closely at the competing claims over health 
and sanitation, this chapter has opened a window onto some of the contra-
dictions inherent in the colony’s sanitary and housing reforms. It was sought 
to explore the cracks and fissures within colonial discourses of planning—
“frictions” that have been, for the most part, overlooked, despite their critical 
role in Hong Kong’s development.
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